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Abstract 
In this paper, we construct a Governance Index for a sample of Greek companies 
quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange. We then classify firms, using each firm 
governance index, into three governance portfolios. Furthermore, the Fama and French 
model, extended to include a momentum variable, is tested for each of the three 
governance portfolios. Our findings suggest that most of the firms in our sample are 
semi-democracies followed by democracies and dictatorships respectively. Good 
governance appears to be of value in as much as we found higher Tobin’s q ratios for 
democracies followed by semi-democracies and dictatorships. We, also, report significant 
negative abnormal returns for shareholder-friendly and manager-friendly firms. The 
findings of significant negative abnormal returns are consistent with inefficient capital 
markets. At a practitioner level, the results imply that firms should practice vigorously 
good governance, as it is a policy of value to shareholders and possibly to other 
stakeholders. 
 
KEYWORDS: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, Democratic and 
Dictatorship Firms 
JEL codes: G30, G14 
                                                 
1 University of Patras 
2 Athens University of Economic and Business 
 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion that corporate governance affects positively corporate performance is 
based on the fact that management in shareholder-friendly firms, in making corporate 
decisions, do what shareholders themselves would have done, had they been in charge of 
corporate decisions. They would have maximized the market value of the firm. 
Corporate government provisions in management-friendly firms, that protect 
management from dismissal, may not be beneficial to shareholders. Such arrangements 
can increase agency costs and, thus, lead to a reduction in shareholder wealth (Manne 
1965) and Easterbrook and Fischel (1981). 
It is possible, however, as argued by some, that protecting management from 
removal may have beneficial effects upon shareholder wealth. Arrangements to protect 
management from appraisal may lead incumbents to invest in long-term projects that 
increase the value of the firm (Stein 1988 and Bebchuk and Lars 1993). Furthermore, 
such arrangements may increase the bargaining power of shareholders and obtain large 
premia in acquisitions. 
Thus, firms with some mild governance provisions that protect management from 
dismissal, but do not permit them to extract large private benefits may be beneficial to 
shareholders. These firms are neither shareholder friendly nor manager friendly, but fall 
in between the above two extreme categories.  
Much has been written on the subject of corporate governance and agency costs. 
There are conflicting views on the issue of the relationship between market value and 
governance. Nevertheless, National Government and Capital Market authorities in many 
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parts of the world, perturbed by recent grave corporate financial scandals, have taken 
drastic steps in reforming corporate governance rules. 
The issue of the relationship between firm market value and governance provisions 
is, primarily, an empirical one. Most of the empirical work on the subject has been 
undertaken in the United States of America with mixed results. Theoretical constructs are 
of value, if they can explain real world behaviour. This necessitates repeated tests with 
data from developed and developing countries. 
The present paper has several objectives. Firstly, it constructs a corporate 
governance index based on the answers to a questionnaire dispatched to the executives of 
Greek firms, the shares of which are quoted on the Athens Sock Exchange. Secondly, it 
explores the issue whether the set of government provisions used by firms is of value to 
shareholders. Thirdly, it investigates the extent to which changes in empirical abnormal 
returns can be explained by changes in the factors contained in the four-factor model 
(Fama and French 1993 and Carhart 1997). It should be mentioned that the effects of 
governance on the market value of firms and equity abnormal returns has not hither to, 
been studied for the Greek Capital Market. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews some of the 
relevant existing work on the subject, section III is concerned with the sources of data 
and research methodology while section IV presents the empirical results. Finally, section 
V concludes the paper. 
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Review of Related Research 
 
In this section we will briefly review only a number of relevant papers as the 
literature, both theoretical and empirical, is vast and has already been reviewed elsewhere 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, John and Senbet 1998, Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, 
Gompers et.al. 2003 and Karathanassis and Drakos 2004). 
We start off with the influential paper presented by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(GIM) (2003). GIM constructed a summary index of corporate governance, which 
included all provisions reported by the Institutional Investors Research Center (IIRC). 
GIM coined the terms democracies and dictatorships. In the first category, they included 
firms that are shareholder-friendly, while the second category comprises firms that are 
manager-friendly. They found that democracies have higher Tobin’s q ratios and better 
operating performance than dictatorships. Furthermore, they reported that democracies 
earned higher positive abnormal returns than dictatorships. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2004) used the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model extended, to include a 
momentum factor (Carhart 1997). They modified GIM’s index concentrating on only six 
government provisions. They then aggregated these six provisions into a single 
explanatory index. They also found that there is a negative relationship between the level 
of the governance index and the market value of the firm. Finally, they found a negative 
relationship between the level of the governance index and abnormal returns. These 
results implied that the capital market was inefficient over their sample period. 
Brown and Caylor (2004) extended GIM’s work, by creating a corporate 
governance index using data provided by ‘Institutional Shareholder Services’. Their 
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Index ‘Gov-Score’ is a composite measure of 51 governance provisions covering eight 
corporate categories. They then related Gov-Score to operating performance, valuation 
and dividend payouts for 2327 firms and found that shareholder-friendly firms are 
relatively more profitable, more valuable and with liberal dividend policies. Their results 
implied that markets were inefficient. This implication was not shared by Johnson, 
Moorman and Sorescu (2005), who introduced a calendar-time control firm approach to 
rectify possible misspecifications in the three-factor Fama and French (1993) 
methodology. Their results showed that neither shareholder-friendly firms nor manager-
friendly firms earned significant abnormal returns. These findings imply that the market 
impounds in the prices of stocks quickly and accurately firms’ government choices. Their 
main implication was that markets were efficient. 
 
 
Data and Research Methodology 
 
Our sample consists of 314 firms quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange. The firms 
were observed over the years 2004 and 2005. It should be noted that in Greece 
compliance to governance provisions has been effective since the fiscal year 2004. In 
order to determine the quality of government practices of the firms in our sample we 
formulated a number of questions based on a number of provisions promulgated by the 
European and U.S.A. authorities. These are similar to those cited in the article by Brown 
and Caylor (2004). The questionnaire was dispatched vial electronic mail to 314 firms 
and completed by firm executives. Of the 314 questionnaires, 262 (83.4%) were 
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completed and returned to us for analysis, which is a very high response for this kind of 
research. We then coded the 55 binary questions, assigning one point for every practice 
(provision) that restricts shareholder rights and zero points for every provision that 
increases shareholder power. As a rule, similar indexes were constructed by earlier 
published works (some of which were reviewed earlier), either by using data supplied by 
Institutional Research Centers or by studying relevant supplements to published accounts. 
In countries where such institutions do not exist, one could have studied firm annual 
accounts (Tsipouri and Xanthakis 2004, Tsipouri, Spanos and Xanthakis 2005, Aksu, 
Mine and Kosedag 2006, Florou and Galarniotis 2007). Such a study could reveal each 
firm’s compliance with relevant governance practices. It should, however, be stressed 
that even though compliance with governance rules may be compulsory, it is possible that 
management may exercise discrection regarding the extent to which some of the 
governance provisions are being practiced. It follows that a study of firm accounts alone 
may not reveal fully the qualitative application of mandatory governance rules. Our 
approach to constructing a governance index is more analytical and direct in as much as it 
involves appraisal of governance provisions at firm level through a number of relevant 
questions put to firm executives. It is, thus, better placed to explain the extent to which 
firms practice governance rules. Our approach is more direct, as we question those firm 
executives who are responsible for the qualitative application of governance rules for 
each firm. We may, therefore, expect reliable classification of firms into categories 
indicating whether a firm is a) shareholder-friendly (democracies), b) manager-friendly 
(dictatorships) or c) semi-democracy. Of the 55 questions only six provisions were taken 
into consideration following the theoretical arguments of Bebchuk et.al. (2004) and 
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Brown and Caylor (2004). These provisions include those factors that may be said more 
effectively to measure the degree of qualitative application of corporate governance. 
These were: staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, 
supermajority, requirements for charter amendments, poisson pills and golden parachute 
arrangements. Along these lines, we established the total score of the answers to the six 
questions and constructed for each firm a score similar to the entrenchment-index created 
by Bebchuk et.al. (2004). Thus, the scores range from 0 to 6. Firms with total scores 
equal and/or less than 1 are classified as democracies, firms with a score equal and/or 
greater than 4 are classified as dictatorships. Firms with a score from 2 to 3 are classified 
as semi-democracies. On the basis of the above classifications we have three types of 
portfolios comprising shareholder-friendly (democracies), manager-friendly 
(dictatorships) and semi-democracy firms. 
Our next step is to determine which one of the above three alternative sets of firms 
dominates the market. In other words, we would like to determine the relationship 
between governance and firm performance. Firm performance will be represented by 
Tobin’s q. The relevant formula is given below: 
c pVAL VAL DebtTQR
TA
+ +=                                                                  (1) 
Due to the complexities of calculating Tobin’s q, as proposed initially by Tobin and 
Brainard (1968), we used an alternative simplified approach proposed by Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) and Perfect and Wiles (1994). Specifically, “VALc” is the stock exchange 
value of common stock at the end of economic year n and “VALp” is the stock exchange 
value of preferred stock at the end of economic year n. Variable “Debt” represents the 
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book value of total Liabilities (Short- and Long-term) at the end of economic year n, 
while variable “TA” represents the book value of total Assets at the end of year n. 
 We now turn to the issue of market efficiency initially through application of the 
Fama and French three-factor model. We then extend the Fama and French methodology 
to include an additional factor that of momentum. 
 
 The three-factor model 
 In this section, we use the methodology advanced by Fama and French (1993). 
The initial CAPM formulation was substituted by the three-factor model, to account for 
additional factors, which were supposed to provide additional information in explaining 
required and/or abnormal rates of return for single shares and portfolios of shares. In the 
third specification a fourth factor was added to account for an additional factor known as 
momentum. 
We replicate the methodology used in previous studies (Gompers et al., 2003. 
Bebchuk et al., 2004. Johnson et al., 2005. Cremers and Nair, 2005) and constructed 
Governance portfolios, in order to examine the existence of abnormal returns on the 
Athens Stock Exchange for the years 2004, 2005. For each calendar month we calculate 
the monthly returns for each of the three weighted Governance portfolios (Democracy, 
Semi-democracy, and Dictatorship portfolios). The portfolios’ construction is achieved 
using the value-weighted method. We then regress the monthly excess returns using the 
three-factor model, as shown below: 
( ) ( ) ttttt HMLSMBRfRmaRfRi εβββ +++−+=− 321                  (2) 
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where ( )
tfi
RR −  is the abnormal return of the firms of each Governance portfolio. In 
other words, it is the return per month of each Governance portfolio after the substraction 
of the riskless interest rate ( )fR , which was extracted from Government bonds. The 
variable ( )
tfm
RR −  represents the excess return on the market portfolio.  is the 
difference of returns of value-weighted portfolios of big size minus the returns of value-
weighted portfolios of small size. 
( tSMB )
( )tHML  is the difference of returns of value-weighted 
portfolios of high book-to-market minus the returns of value-weighted portfolios of low 
book-to-market. The intercept “a” is interpreted as the mean monthly abnormal return of 
each Governance portfolio. If the intercept “a” is statistically significant, then excess 
returns do exist (Gompers et al., 2003. Bebchuk et al., 2004. Johnson et al., 2005). 
The above model was tested using Ordinary Least Squares. 
 
The Four-Factor Model 
Carhart (1997) in an effort to evaluate fund managers, extended the Fama and 
French model and added an additional factor that of Momentum. We use the additional 
four factor model in order to determine the extent to which this additional variable 
improves the explanatory power of the model. The four-factor model may be written as: 
( ) ( ) tttttt MomentumHMLSMBRfRmaRfRi εββββ ++++−+=− 4321         (3) 
where Momentum is the difference of returns of portfolios with high returns in the past 
minus the returns of portfolios with small returns in the past. The momentum variable has 
duration of twelve months and is based on the methodology advanced by Otten and Bams 
(2002). All the data that concern stock returns, Government bonds as well as the General 
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Index of the Athens Stock Exchange have been collected from the Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission and the “DataStream” database. 
 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1.A shows the number of firms belonging to each broad category of 
governance practices explained earlier. 
 
[Table 1.A. enters here] 
 
 As can be seen from this table, semi-democracies dominate the Greek Capital 
Market, followed by democracies and dictatorships. An interesting result is that nearly 
60% of firms are semi-democracies. This is possibly due to the fact that most firms, in 
Greece, are family-owned with benevolent owner-managing directors, who grant outside 
shareholders a sense of involvement in the firm’s corporate affairs. Institutional Investors 
who hold shares in such firms have aligned themselves with management interests (which 
coincide with the interest of the founders-owners of the firm). The average outside 
shareholder in such firms passively accept managerial decisions, which are also accepted 
by institutional investors given their strategic alignment motives (Pound 1988). Under 
this regime, we should expect the management of semi-democracy firms to pay lip-
service to good governance, while the management of democracy firms may be quite 
liberal towards the good governance practices. On a priori grounds, we should expect 
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democracy firms to perform better than semi-democracy firms, which in turn may 
perform better than dictatorships. 
To construct Tobin’s q, which is unique for each company and year, we used 
published yearly financial statements, as well as the stock prices on the last day of 
negotiation for the years 2004 and 2005. 
In order to find what kind of relation exists between Tobin’s q and Corporate 
Governance, we use the one-way analysis of variance (ONE WAY ANOVA) for each 
year. 
Tables 1.B. and 1.C. show the results from the analysis of variance (ONE WAY 
ANOVA). We observe that there exists a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between firm value, as is calculated by Tobin’s q and the level of Corporate Governance 
for both years (2004, 2005). Specifically, and with regard to 2004, it appears that 
Democracies have a much higher Tobin’s q (mean = 1.504) compared to Semi-
democracy firms (mean = 0.778) and Dictatorships (mean = 0.575). This difference in the 
means of the three Governance portfolios was found to be statistically significant (F = 
34.9, df = 2, p-value < 0.01). A similar tendency is also observed for the year 2005. The 
higher Tobin’s qs for Democracies, has a mean equal to 1.54, followed by Semi-
democracies (mean = 0.906) and Dictatorships (mean = 0.67). For the year 2005, this 
difference in means was found to be statistically significant (F = 14.772, df = 2, p-value < 
0.01). 
[Table 1.B enters here] 
[Table 1.C enters here] 
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From tables 1.B. and 1.C. we conclude that our a priori expectations regarding the 
relationship of governance practices and performance, represented by Tobin’s q, were 
realized. It would seem that the market recognizes that good governance practices are 
valuable and are incorporated into the share prices of firms with strong shareholder 
rights. These results are similar to those reported elsewhere as was mentioned earlier. The 
implications of our results are obvious for Government and Capital Market Authorities, 
as well as for the managers of firms and shareholders. It would not be appropriate at this 
juncture to elaborate and expand on the above implications, as our data cover only two 
years. Lack of adequate data did not permit us to conduct elaborate techniques, which 
might have led to robust results. 
We now turn to the issue of market efficiency through use of the Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997) methodologies. Specifically, the four-factor model will be 
tested with two different portfolios of firms. One portfolio, as explained earlier, consists 
of shareholder friendly firms and the second comprises manager-friendly firms. The 
results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
The explanatory power of the three-factor model is very good. The value of the 
intercept is statistically significant for democracies and dictatorships. For the portfolio 
comprising shareholder-friendly firms, the variables HML and SMB do not add any 
information in explaining the dependent variable. For semi-democracy the value of ‘a’ is 
statistically insignificant, while the independent variables (Rm-Rf) and HML add to the 
explanatory power of the model. In the third portfolio, that of manager-friendly firms all 
independent variables are statistically significant with lower explanatory power than the 
first two portfolios. 
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The value of the intercept for the democracy portfolio implies an annual negative 
abnormal return equal to 20.18% while for the dictatorship portfolio it is equal to 
37.06%. For the portfolio with semi-democracy firms it is also negative but not 
statistically significant. There is, thus, some evidence that stock returns of the portfolio 
with strong power for managers were affected more adversely than the other two 
categories of portfolios.  
 The addition of the fourth leading factor, that of momentum, does not add to the 
explanatory power of the model as shown in Table 3. 
 Overall, our results appear to imply that investors recognize that governance is of 
value, which is incorporated into the market value of firms. This follows from the results 
of table 1.B., where it is shown that the mean q value for democracies is larger than the 
mean value of the other two portfolios (dictatorships and semi-democracies). 
 Our findings of significant negative abnormal returns for two of the three 
portfolios seem to imply that the market is inefficient. This might, prima facie, appear to 
be inconsistent, given the above-mentioned finding of the value of relevance of good 
governance. 
 The market may price good/bad governance provisions, but the full adjustment 
could take a long time to be effected. In some other instances, such as earnings 
adjustments (Bernard and Thomas 1989) and dividend surprises (Michaely, Thaler and 
Womack 1995) there has been a long time before the market fully adjusted the event. 
 Thus, to the extent that the market at the end of the sample period has adjusted 
fully the effects of the event or has overreacted in either direction, the relationship 
between excess returns and the independent variables might be zero, negative or positive. 
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In our case, one could say that the price adjustment has been incomplete resulting thus, in 
negative risk premia. 
 
[Table 2 enters here] 
[Table 3 enters here] 
 
 
Conclusions and Suggestions for further research 
 
Corporate Governance provisions in Greece have been in effect since 2004. The 
changes in governance structure effected recently are known to all concerned as 
evidenced by several reports in the media. It is probably too early to expect the market 
fully to recognize and price the effects of governance provisions on firm performance and 
whether it is a factor influencing stock returns. Our results have shown that most of the 
firms quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange are Semi-democratic. One could be tempted 
to say that in these firms power is evenly shared by shareholders and managers. As 
regards the effect of governance and firm performance there appears to be a stronger 
association between firm performance and the application of provisions friendly to 
shareholders. 
Even though the present paper does not constitute a direct approach to the issue of 
market efficiency, we along with other extant papers, attempted to shed some light on 
whether over the sample period the market has been efficient. Our benchmark in doing so 
has been the influential three-factor methodology proposed and tested by Fama and 
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French nearly fifteen years ago. The explanatory value of the model was very good. The 
value of the intercept, representing excess return, was negative for the three portfolios 
examined and statistically significant for the democracy and dictatorship portfolios. Our 
results imply annual negative abnormal returns of 20.13% and 37.06%, respectively for 
the democracy and dictatorship portfolios. For the semi-democracy portfolio no such 
abnormal return exists. One could, tentatively, conclude that the average return for the 
democracy portfolio was adversely affected, but not as severely as that of the dictatorship 
portfolio. Whether or not this is a direct consequence of the value relevance of the 
application of good governance rules is a moot issue. This could imply use of an 
inefficient proxy for the true market portfolio (Roll and Ross 1994 and Berk 1995). There 
is some evidence, from our work and from the work of others, that manager-friendly 
firms were accompanied by poor performance both in terms of firm value and stock 
returns. If the results were affected by unobservable firm and time characteristics then a 
different methodology is called for. One should or instance use panel data analysis, where 
those unobservable firm and time unobservable effects could be taken into account 
indirectly. To achieve this, one would need more temporal data, which are not as yet 
available.  
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Tables 
Table 1.A. Descriptive Statistics for the Distribution of Sample Firms into the 
Three Governance Portfolios. 
Portfolios Frequencies Percent 
Democracies 64 24.4% 
Semi-democracies 155 59.2% 
Dictatorships 43 16.4% 
TOTAL 262 100% 
 
Table 1.B. Means and Standard Deviation of Tobin’s Q for Each Governance 
Portfolio and Sample Year. 
 Year 2004 Year 2005 
 Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
Democracies 1.505 0.132 1.540 1.412 
Semi-democracies 0.778 0.035 0.907 0.654 
Dictatorships 0.576 0.081 0.671 0.746 
 
Table 1.C. Analysis of Variance of Tobin’s Q ratio 
Year 2004 Year 2005 
F-Statistic p-value F-Statistic p-value 
14.772 < 0.001 34.902 < 0.001 
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Table 2. Regression Analysis of the Three-Factor Model. 
Governance 
Portfolios 
Intercept 
“a” 
RMRF HML SMB Adj.R2 F-Prob. 
DEMOCRACIES 
-1.6776** 
(-3.986) 
0.8586** 
(10.785) 
0.0235 
(0.376) 
0.0246 
(0.2383) 
85.36% <0.001 
SEMI-
DEMOCRACIES 
-0.8905 
(-1.692) 
0.9201** 
(9.243) 
0.1747* 
(2.235) 
-0.0314 
(-0.244) 
83.72% <0.001 
DICTATORSHIPS 
-3.0880** 
(-3.460) 
0.6744** 
(3.995) 
0.2767* 
(2.088) 
0.4784* 
(2.188) 
56.67% <0.001 
(*) (**) Significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 3. Regression Analysis of Four-Factor Model. 
 
Governance 
Portfolios 
Intercept 
“a” 
RMRF HML SMB Momentum Adj. R2 F-Prob. 
DEMOCRACIES 
-2.0493* 
(-2.358) 
0.8728** 
(10.128) 
0.0289 
(0.447) 
0.0218 
(0.207) 
0.0189 
(0.492) 
84,78% <0,001 
SEMI-
DEMOCRACIES 
0.2680 
(0.255) 
0.8757** 
(8.410) 
0.1578 
(2.021) 
-0.0228 
(-0.179) 
-0.0589 
(-1.269) 
84,21% <0,001 
DICTATORSHIPS 
-4.9090* 
(-2.741) 
0.7442** 
(4.190) 
0.3031* 
(2.275) 
0.4648* 
(2.142) 
0.0926 
(1.169) 
57,45% <0,001 
(*) (**) Significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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